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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR TOE STATE OF UTAH

HELEN JANE WALTERS,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.
LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

Supreme Court No. 91011 6

Defendant/Respondent.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did

the Utah Court

oi

Appeals

er. by

-lu^-t^*^

incorrect standards of review?
II.

Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court ot Ucan to

determine whether Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-L-4.5 is to be
applied retroactively?
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-1-4.5, Reproduced

m

Appendix F.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an action for divorce

involving the distribution of real and personal property a£ vveLl
as an award for attorney's fees.
B.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BLLOW.

On

October 26, 1987, the Petitioner/Plaintiff filed a Complaint for
divorce. (R.l).

On February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before
1

the Honorable Ray M. Harding

for purposes

of terminating

tne

marriage and dividing real and personal property. (R.3-4j.
Following the trial, Judge Harding entered a Memorandum
Decision finding "that the parties be^an to carry on a marriage
like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, which was several
years before the marriage was actually solemnized." (R.99).
From
Harding

found

the established
that

date of January

the Plaintiff

wa.3 entitled

1, 19bu, Jud«je
to a :;nare of

Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of the
marriage.

The formula used to apportion the Plaintiff's snare )£

the retirement benefits was derived from Marcnant v. Marchant, 7-13
P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), which takes into consideration the
number

of years or months

in which

the parties were married.

(R.100).
With regards to the distribution of real property, in its
Memorandum Decision dated February 15, 1989, the trial court found
that the real property acquired after January 1, 1980, was marital
property and proceeded to divide the same on an equitable basis.
(R.101).
On

July

31, 1989,

the

trial

court,

in

it.s second

Memorandum Decision, awarded the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS
($1,000.00) for attorney's fees "based on need and the relative
ability of the parties to pay.11 (R.115).
2

Prior to this decision,

it was represented to the Court that the Plaintiff was totally seLf
supported from income earned from her employment at Geneva SteeL,
(R.lll), and as incorporated in the Findings of Fact, it was found
that neither party appeared to be in present need of or entitled
to the continuing financial support of the other, either in tne
form of alimony or child support. (R.149).
The foregoing Memorandums were incorporated in a:. Amended
Decree of Divorce (R.168).
On November 9, 1989, the Defendant filed his Notice of
Appeal from the decision rendered by Judge Harding. (R.17-2).
Upon the conclusion of oral argument and briefing, the
Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion on the 14th day of May,
1991.

(See Appendix A ) .

In such opinion, the Utah Court of

Appeals concluded as a matter of law that the parties' marriage
began on October 5, 1984, the date of its solemnization, and that
the property acquired before that date was pre-marital property,
and

property

acquired

after

that

date

was

marital

property.

(Appendix A, Page 5 ) . The case was remanded to the trial court to
make sufficiently detailed findings and to properly categorize the
parties1

property

as being part of

the marital

estate

or

as

separate property, and then equitably distributing the property.
As a starting point, the Defendant is entitled to the real property
acquired before the parties1 marriage, and a 50 percent interest
3

in the real property acquired after the marriage.
Page 6 ) ,

(Appendix A,

Also, the Court of Appeals reversed the triai court's

award of attorney's fees after reviewing the record, stating that
it was "clear Helen Walters failed to demonstrate her need to an
award of attorney's fees."

(Appendix A, Page 7 ) .

The Plaintiff subsequently filed her Ex Parte Motion for
Enlargement of Time followed by her Petition for Writ; of Certiorari
on the 30th day of July, 1991.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The Plaintiff ana Defendant met

in December of 1978 at which time, the Plaintiff, and her t>vo year
old daughter from a previous marriage, resided in her traiier which
was located in Orem, Utah. (Tr.15,30-31).

The Defendant, working

for the United States Air Force, was frequently called to work on
Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missiLe
sites. (Tr.92).

The Defendant resided in several states from 19/8

through 1974 because of these TDY assignments. During this, period,
he resided in Montana, Missouri, South Dakota, Wyoming and North
Dakota. (Exh.10) (Tr.72-74,92) .

While the Defendant resided In

these several states from 1978 through 1984, he made infrequent
returns

to Utah.

maintained

(Tr.53).

During

a habitual trailer

this period,

the

Defendant

in Highland, Utah, of wnich the

water, gas, and utilities were always nooked up. (Tr.53-54/.

4

However, when the Defendant would return to Utah, he lived with the
Plaintiff in her trailer. (Tr. 54).
In July of 1977, the Defendant acquired real property In
Highland, Utah. (Tr.94) (Exh.ll).
property

was made

by

Said final payment for chis

the Defendant

on May

23, 1981.

i Tr.94)

(Exh.14).
When the parties first met, the Plaintiff resided in her
trailer in Orem, Utah.

In May of 1980, the Defendant purchased,

in his own name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant
Grove, Utah. (Tr.96) (Exh.15). At that time, the parties m e e d the
Plaintiff's mobile trailer onto that property.

The Defenaani paid

for the cost of moving the trailer to the Pleasant Grove location
as

well

as

connections.

the

costs

(Tr.96).

incurred
From

for

that

culinary

time

water

forward,

the

anc

sewer

Fiaintiff

continually resided in her trailer at that location. The Defendant
paid for substantial improvements at this site. (Tr.37,9c .

The

Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rer.t for the placement of her
trailer on the pad or for her use of tne realty as ner residence.
(Tr.39).
everyday

The Plaintiff was able to use her resources tor the
necessities

for

herself

and

her

daughter

sucn

as

groceries, utilities, and trailer payments. (Tr.39).
Prior to and after the Plainciff moved her trailer onto
Defendant's lot, the Defendant assisted the Plaintiff by paying a
5

number of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's totalling TEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE DOLLARS ($10,371.00) of which
the Defendant made no claims for nor expected anything in return.
(Tr.88,105).

At the time the Defendant paid these expenses, there

was not an arrangement with regard to a marital relationsnip.
In the Fall of 1981/ with the Defendant's knowledge, the
Plaintiff enrolled her daughter in school under the last .iame ,f
Walters. (Tr.42-43,107 ) •
From
returns under

1978 through

1983, the Plaintiff

the name of Hunter, the name from

marriage. (Tr.49-52) (Exh.3).

filed

r.er tax-

her

previous

Not until 1984, the year :nat the

parties were married, did the parties file a joint tax return.
(Tr.52).
Prior to their marriage in 3 984, the Plaintiff and tiie
Defendant kept separate checking accounts of which the Defendant
never

intermingled

his money

with

the

Plaintiff's.

(Tr.58).

Nevertheless, the Defendant would periodically help the Plaintiff
by paying her debts and obligations.

(Tr.58-59) (Ex.13).

In July of 1984, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant LII
North Dakota where the parties resided together.
October

5, 1984, the parties were married

(Tr.ll).

6

(Tr.44,72).

On

in Manitoba, Canada.

On July 19, 1985, the Defendant, with his own fund.*,
acquired in his name a parcel of property located at 640 South 50
West in Pleasant Grove, Utah.

(Tr.99) (Ex.11,16).

This property

was in the same trailer park facility as the 625 South 50 West
property of which the parties lived.

In October 1985, L-c::endant

placed his trailer on that property.

(Tr.100).

Defendant h.id

purchased such trailer in 1977 which he had kept in highland, Ucai:.
(Tr.101).

At the time of trial, (Febraary 1989) the 640 S utn •)()

West property had an encumbrance of $5,000.00.
During

(Tr.81) v£:-..il).

the marriage, differences between

the parties

developed resulting in their separation on or about Novemoer 10,
1987.

(R.149).
At the time the parties met, the Plaintiff was employed

by Geneva Steel.
when

Geneva

Steel

This employment continued except for a period
ceased

operations.

At

the

time or

trial,

Plaintiff had been reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately
one (1) year.
Pleasant

(Tr.36-37).

Grove, Utah,

While living at 625 South 50 West,

the Plaintiff

contributed

her

earnings

towards the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. (R.151).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff

challenges

the Utah Court

of Appeals'

application of well established standards of review.

However, the

7

Plaintiff

fails to acknowledge

that

the Utah Court of AppeaLs

reviewed the legal conclusions of the trial court in rendering its
decision and did not base its decision on the factual findings of
the trial court.

An appellate court accords conclusions of law

with no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness.
That is what the Court of Appeals did in reviewing this case-.

in

any event, the Utah Court of Appeals did not consider the factual
findings of the trial court in conflict with established standar-.is
of review as the Plaintiff argues.
This case does not present a special or important reason
for

the

Utah

impression.

Supreme

Court

to

review

as

a matter

or

first

The Plaintiff asks the Court to settle the question

of whether, in appropriate circumstances, a married couple's period
of cohabitation prior to the solemnization of their marriage can
be considered a part of their marriage.

Under the facts of this

case, the Plaintiff is asking the Utah Supreme Court to apply Utah
Code

Annotated

Section

statute, retroactively.
ruled

that

Section

30-1-4.5,

Utah's

common

law

marriage

The Utah Court of Appeals has already

30-1-4.5 may not be applied

retroactively.

Section 30-1-4.5 was not enacted until 1987, subsequent to the time
of

the disputed

events

of

this case.

Because

the

purported

marriage-like relationship occurred before 1987, the Plaintiffs
question, whether a married couple's period of cohabitation prior
8

to the solemnization of their marriage can be considered a part of
their marriage, is not ripe for the Utah Supreme Court to review
under the facts of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REVIEWED
THE TRIAL COURT*S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR
CORRECTNESS AND PROPERLY DISTURBED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION ON THE BASIS THAT THERE WAS
A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The Utah Court
court,

in distributing

of Appeals determined
the parties1

property,

that
found

tne trial
that

tne

parties began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about
January 1, 1980.

In its review of Utah case law, the Utan Court

of Appeals

that

ruled

the parties' relationship

could

not be

treated as a marriage prior to its solemnization which occurred on
October 5, 1984.

The Utah Court of Appeals had previously ruled

that "before adoption of Section 30-1-4.5 in 1987, Utah did not
recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a marriage, even though
the parties to the relationship may have acted in other respects
as spouses."

Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App.

1989),

Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App.

1988).

The Utah Court of Appeals once again pointed

Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively.

:ut th.it

Lay ton, at 50v.">.

Under Utah law, the Utah Court of Appeals properly concluded as a
9

matter of law that the Walter's marriage began on October 5, 198 4,
the date of its solemnization, and that the property acquired
before that date should be treated as pre-marital property, and
property acquired after that date should be treated as marital
property.

It was appropriate for the Utah Court of Appeals to

disturb the trial court's decision as the trial court's application
of the law was a clear abuse of discretion.
P.2d

1149, 1151

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Smith v. Smith, 7 M

The Court

followed the established principles that an appellate

of AppeaLs
COLIC

is to

accord conclusions of law with no particular deference, but snouLd
review them for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d iU6d,

1070 (Utah 1985) .
As stated above, the Defendant maintains that trie Utah
Court of Appeals used the appropriate standard of review a..o that
as a matter of law, the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
(Appendix A, Page 3 ) . Citing Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1 1 ^ , il)i
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) .
Because the issues involved in this case are questions
of law and not of fact, the Utah Court of Appeals did not ccr.sider
the factual findings of the trial court in a manner which conflicts
with established standards of review.

There is not an lSi^e as to

whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly errjneoui.
The issue is whether the trial court's application of the law was
10

a clear abuse of discretion.

The Utah Court of Appeals determined

that there was a clear abuse of discretion.

Because the issues

involved in this case are a question of law and not of fact, the
issue of marshalling of the evidence is also inapplicable in this
case.
With

regard

to

the

Plaintiff's

assertion

that

the

Defendant did not preserve the issue of attorney's fees foi appeal,
the reasoning of the Plaintiff is also unsound.
real issue is a question of law.

Once again, the

To award attorney's fees., a trial

court must find that the requesting party is in need of rinanci.il
assistance and that the fees requested are reasonaole.
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Riche v.

Though there was

evidence in the record finding that the attorney's fees awarded
were reasonable, there was no evidence in the record demonstrating
the Plaintiff's need for an award of attorney's fee.

As a .natter

of law, the appellate court was able to determine that m e r e was
a clear abuse of discretion in awarding attorney's fees without
proper evidence indicating a need for such.

It was not tne duty

of the Defendant to apprise the trial court during trial tnat tne
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate her need for an award of attorney's
fees.

To do so, would jeopardize his position.

Tne trial court

did not render its decision, awarding attorney's fees, until aftt-r
the trial in a separate Memorandum Decision, thus not affording the
11

Defendant the opportunity to make an objection for purposes of
preservation for appeal.
Because

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

used

the

proper

standard of review with regard to the question of law at issue, it
is not necessary nor proper for the Utah Supreme Court to review
the Court of Appeal's decision.
POINT II
THE
QUESTION
OF
WHETHER,
UNDER
THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, A MARRIED COUPLE'S PERIOD OF
COHABITATION PRIOR TO THE SOLEMNIZATION OF
THEIR MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PART OF
THEIR MARRIAGE, IS NOT A SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT
REASON FOR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW AS
A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, NOR IS THE
QUESTION RIPE FOR REVIEW.
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute, Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-1-4.5, was not enacted until 1987. In the instant case,
the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that before the adoption of
Section

30-1-4.5,

relationship

as

relationship

may

a

"Utah

did

marriage,
have

acted

not
even
in

lecognize
though

other

the

an

unsolemnized

parties

respects

to

the

as. spouses."

(Appendix A, Page 5 ) ; Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d, 504, 505 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (Citing Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 13 81 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)).

Also, the Court of Appeals pointed

Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively.

out the

Lay ton, at 50').

Under this established Utah law, the Court of Appeals concluded as

12

a matter of law that the Walter's relationship could not be created
as a marriage prior to its solemnization on October 5, 19 6*.
What the Plaintiff is seeking the Utah Supreme C^rt i:c
do at this juncture is to reconsider whether Section 30-X-4.5 is
to be applied

retroactively.

This question

has already

addressed and ruled upon by the Utah Court of Appeals.
505; Mattes, at 1181.

oeen

Layton, at

The Court of Appeals' reasoning, in ruling

that Section 30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively, was sound,
and it is not necessary for the Utah Supreme Court to reucw,
The Plaintiff challenges the provision of Sect:c:i J O - L 4.5(2) which provides that "the determination or establishment of
a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship
described

in sub-section

termination

of

that

(1), or within one year following tne

relationship."

However,

the

unsclemnized

relationship in the instant case occurred prior to 1987, tne date
Section

30-1-4.5

was

enacted.

Because

the

unsclemnized

relationship occurred prior to 1987, the Plaintiff's challenge of
Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not ripe for the Supreme Court to decide.
Because

Section

30-1-4.5

is

not

to

be

applied

retroactively, and that challenging Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not ripe
under the facts of this case, it is not appropriate for the Supreme
Court of Utah to review the Court of Appeals' decision or this
case.
13

DATED this

30

day of August, 1991.

iU-^z.

ODY tf
ROBERT L. MOOI
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APPENDIX

FILED

APPENDIX "A'

MAY 141991
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

£^$U^

OOOoo
Helen Jayne Walters,

Clerk of tfrftQamtt
OPINION
(For Publication)

^*^

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890671-CA
Lewis Mark Walters,
Defendant and Appellant

F I L E D
(May 14, 1991)

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

Robert L. Moody, Provo, for Appellant
Thomas H. Means, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant, Lewis Mark Walte rs (Mark Walter s), appeals from
an amended decree of divorce awa rding appellee, Helen Jane
Walters (Helen Walters) a share of the parties' realty, a
proportionate share of Mark Walt ers's retiremen t benefits, and
attorney fees. Mark Walters cha llenges the dec ree on two
grounds: (1) the trial court er red by establis hing a marital
relationship between the parties from January 1 1980 until
October 5, 1984, and (2) the tri al court erred by awarding
attorney fees where there was no evidence of fi nancial need,
Helen Walters raises the issue o f Mark Walters1 s standing to
bring this appeal.
1. Helen Walters argues that Mark Walters is without standing
because, after trial and prior to this appeal, he transferred
to third parties his interests in the real properties at
issue. However, her challenge to Mark Walters1s standing is
premised upon alleged transactions which took place subsequent
to the trial court's memorandum decision and which are not part
of the trial record or the record on appeal. Hence, appellee's
remedy, if any, regarding those transactions lies in the trial
court.

FACTS
Helen Walters and Mark Walters met in late 1978. Helen
Walters, was then, and at all relevant times, employed at
Geneva Steel. Mark Walters was employed by the United States
Air Force and was frequently assigned temporary duty
assignments out of state. When he would return to Utah for
visits, Mark Walters lived with Helen Walters in her trailer.
Mark Walters also maintained a habitable trailer on property
(Parcel 1) he owned prior to meeting Helen Walters, in
Highland, Utah. Parcel 1 had been purchased by Mark Walters in
1977 and he made final payment on it in 1981.
In addition to Parcel 1, Mark Walters owned a trailer pad
at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel 2 ) . This
had been purchased in his name in 1980. Helen Walters's mobile
trailer was moved to Parcel 2 in 1980. Mark Walters paid all
the expenses incurred as result of that move. Helen Walters
arranged for and participated in improvements to this property
and Mark Walters paid for those improvements.
From 1978 through 1983, Helen Walters filed her separate
tax returns under the name of Hunter. Her daughter, Shantel,
from a previous marriage, resided with Helen and Mark Walters,
and was enrolled in school under the last name of Walters. In
addition Mark Walters contributed to Shantel's financial
support. Mark Walters's 1982 through 1984 federal income tax
returns listed Shantel as a dependent living with him. In
1984, the parties were ceremoniously married and they filed a
joint income tax return. Prior to 1984, the parties maintained
separate checking accounts.
In July 1985, Mark Walters purchased a third trailer pad
located at 640 South 50 West in Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel
3). This property was in the same trailer park as "Parcel 2.
In October 1985, he moved his trailer from Parcel 1 in
Highland, Utah, to Parcel 3.
On October 26, 1987, Helen Walters filed for divorce, and
on February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before the trial
court to terminate their marriage and divide their real and
personal property. Following the trial, the court issued a
memorandum decision finding "that the parties began to carry on
a marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, jwhich
was several years before the marriage was actually
solemnized." The court determined that Helen Walters was to
receive Parcel 2 in Pleasant Grove where her mobile home was
located. Mark Walters was to keep Parcels 1 and 3. Helen
Walters was also awarded a portion of Mark Walters's retirement

benefits to be calculated from January 1, 1980/ using the
formula set forth in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 205-06
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). On July 31, 1989, in a second memorandum
decision, the trial court awarded Helen Walters $1,000 for
attorney fees "based on need and the relative ability of the
parties to pay."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has considerable
discretion concerning property distribution. This court will
not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751
P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
In distributing the parties' property, the trial court
found that they began to carry on a marriage-like relationship
on or about January 1, 1980. In making this finding, the court
considered a number of factors: (1) Mark Walters stayed in
Helen Walters*s trailer with her when he was not working out of
state, (2) Mark Walters had Helen Walters's trailer moved onto
a lot for which he was paying, and did not charge rent, (3)
Helen Walters made improvements on the property such as would
be expected of a married couple, (4) Mark Walters paid debts
for the plaintiff including debts to the I.R.S. and the tax
commission, and (5) while working out of state, Mark Walters
sent Helen Walters money on which to live.
Mark Walters challenges the trial court's property
distribution on grounds that the trial court erred in ruling
that their marriage relationship began January 1, 1980, and in
distributing the property according to that ruling. Helen
Walters argues that the trial court did not err, but rather
used its broad discretion in distributing the parties'
premarital and marital property.
"When a decree of divorce is entered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, and parties. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1)
(1989). The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that this statute
confers "broad discretion upon trial courts in the division of
property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition."
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987)(citations
omitted). Further, "the purpose of property divisions is to
allocate property in the manner which 'best serves the needs of
the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate

lives.*" Noble v. Npfrle, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah
1988)(quoting Burke 733 P.2d at 135)).
As a general rule, however, premarital property is viewed
__
separate
property, and equity usually requires that "each
as s
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the
marriage." Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). However, this rule is not invariable. "In
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need
consider all of the pertinent circumstances." Burke, 733 P.2d
at 135. Factors generally considered are:
the amount and kind of property to be
divided; whether the property was acquired
before or during the marriage; the source of
the property; the health of the parties; the
parties' standard of living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage; the parties' ages
at time of marriage and of divorce; what the
parties gave up by the marriage; and the
necessary relationship the property division
has with the amount of alimony and child
support to be awarded. Of particular
concern . . . is whether one spouse has made
any contribution toward the growth of the
separate assets of the other spouse and
whether the assets were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
Id. (Citations omitted). Thus, where unique circumstances
exist, a trial court may reallocate premarital property as part
of a property division incident to divorce. Haumont, 793 P.2d
at 424-25. See also Burt v. Burt, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32
(Ct. App. 1990).
Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that the trial
court, before exercising its discretionary power to distribute
property, determine what property is premarital and what
property is marital. To that end, the court must properly
determine when the parties were lawfully married.
To permit appellate review of a trial court's propertydivision, the lower court must have made adequate factual
findings. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. The findings should be
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.'" Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d
199, 202-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).

In the instant case, the findings are not altogether clear
as to how the trial court determined what was premarital
property and what was marital property. The court's analysis
focused on various factors leading the court to conclude that
the parties' marriage-like relationship began January 1, 1980.
We disagree. Under Utah law,, the Walters' relationship could
not be treated as a marriage prior to its solemnization on
October 5, 1984. "Before adoption of section 30-1-4.5 in 1987,
Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a
marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have
acted in other respects as spouses."2 Layton v. Lavton, 777
P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(citing Mattes v. Olearain,
759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). Further, section
30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Id. at 505.
Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the Walters'
marriage began on October 5, 1984, the date of its
solemnization. Property acquired before that date is
premarital property and property acquired after is marital
property. Specifically, Parcels 1 and 2 are premarital
properties and Parcel 3 is marital property. Further, any
apportionment of Mark Walters's retirement benefits should be
calculated by using the formula in Marchant and October 5, 1984
used as the date of the parties' marriage.

2. Section 30-1-4.5 recognizes a marriage relationship between
cohabitants if the relationship satisfies certain specified
requirements.
3. It is unclear why the court awarded Helen Walters any
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits while awarding
him no interest in her benefits. Ordinarily, the court should
either award each spouse his or her own benefits, or award each
a fifty percent interest in the benefits of the other, insofar
as accumulated during the marriage. See, e.g.. Burt, 145 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 31. However, here Mark Walters's appeal of this
issue is limited to arguing that the trial court used the wrong
date in calculating Helen Walters's interest in his benefits.
No argument was made that Helen Walters was entitled to no
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits, nor that he was
entitled to a corresponding interest in her benefits.

Before a trial court can include either of the parties*
premarital property in the marital estate, it must find unique
circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that
premarital property is separate property. See Burke, 733 P.2d
at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424-25. Those findings must be
sufficiently detailed to show how the court distributed the
parties' property. Marchant, 743 P.2d at 202-03. In the case
at bar, the only relevant unique circumstance discussed by the
trial court was the fact that Helen Walters helped arrange for
and make improvements to Parcels 1 and 2. The court did not
consider any of the other factors generally considered by
courts when equitably distributing property pursuant to a
divorce. See Burke, 733 P.2d at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at
425. Further, the findings are insufficiently detailed to
indicate how the trial court arrived at its decision.
Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision, and to make
sufficiently detailed findings to support that distribution.
On remand, the trial court should "first properly categorize
the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as
separate property of one or the other." Burt, 145 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 32. As a starting point then, Mark Walters is entitled
to all of Parcels 1 and 2, and a fifty percent interest in
Parcel 3. Helen Walters is entitled to a fifty percent
interest in Parcel 3. Following the analysis in Burt, "the
court should then consider the existence of exceptional
circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to effect an
equitable distribution in light of those circumstances . . . ."
Id.4
ATTORNEY FEES
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), a court may award
attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. "In order to award
attorney fees, the trial court must find the requesting party
is in need of financial assistance and that the fees requested
are reasonable." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (citations omitted).
The record contains evidence upon which to find that the
attorney fees awarded were reasonable. Helen Walters's
attorney testified regarding the amount and type of services
4. For example, since Helen Walters's trailer sits on Parcel
2, Mark Walters's separate property, the court may decide to
treat that parcel as marital property, and Parcel 3, otherwise
marital property, as Mark Walters*s separate property, assuming
the two properties are of comparable value.

rendered and submitted a supporting affidavit- However, the
findings do not discuss the evidence upon which the trial court
based Helen Walters*s need for such fees. Moreover, upon
reviewing the record, it is clear Helen Walters failed to
demonstrate her need for an award of attorney fees. The trial
court found that neither party was presently in need of
financial support from the other. This finding suggests that
Helen Walters is not in need of long-term financial
assistance. Further, the record does not reveal that she has
any need of short-term financial assistance. Therefore, we
reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees.
Helen Walters also seeks an award of attorney fees on
appeal. She first asks this court to award attorney fees
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33(a) on the ground that this is a
frivolous appeal. Obviously it is not, since appellant
prevailed.
Helen Walters also seeks an awa rd of her attorney fees
incurred in this appeal pursuant to section 30-3-3. This court
has previously awarded attorney fee s on appeal under section
30-3-3. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P. 2d 156, 163 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). However, as we have already discussed, in awarding
attorney fees under section 30-3-3, both the need for, and the
reasonableness of, an award of atto rney fees must first be
determined. Riche, 784 P.2d at 470
Helen Walters has not
demonstrated a need for an award of attorney fees below,
Further, we see no new circumstance s warranting an award of
attorney fees in this appeal. Ther efore, we decline to award
attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we reverse and remand the trial court's
distribution of the parties' pr operty, and reverse the trial
court's award of attorney fees
We decline to award fees on
appeal.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*********************

HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

CASE NUMBER

CV 87 2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*********************

The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement,
will rule at this time.
The Court finds that the parties in this action are
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party.
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was
actually solemnized.
The Court considered a number of factors in determining
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and
did not charge rent.
The plaintiff made improvements on the

property such as would be expected of a married couple.
The
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission.
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state,
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January
1st, 1980.
This is an approximate date because the Court does
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date.
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff - is
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the
defendant retires.
If for any reason the defendant does not
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator
consists of the number of years or months they were married
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government
and the denominator is the total number of years of months
defendant was in such employment."
Marchant, at 206.
The
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement
benefits.

The real property which is at issue was partially
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for,
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the
real property.
The plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear.
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that
property.
The Court finds that this is a fair division of the
property which was either acquired or paid for during the
marriage.
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those.
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account,
and $2750.00 of the America First account.
The Court has no evidence of values with which to
divide the disputed personal property of the parties.
The
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a
division of property between themselves, or having one party
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and
the proceeds divided.
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees
upon submission of affidavits by counsel.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the
Court for signature.

Dated this 15th day of February, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Robert L. Moody, Esq,
Thomas H. Means, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*********************

HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

CV 87-2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

-vsLEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*********************

The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature.
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989.
BY THe=5B^T:

M. HARDING, JUDGE
cc:

Thomas H. Means, Esq.
Robert L. Moody, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
V

]
;|

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

])

No. CV 87 2408

;

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter,
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now
hereby enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior
thereto.
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200
West, Orem, Utah.
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist.
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on
or about 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or
about May, 1980. Plaintifffs daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary schools servicing that address for jher entire
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
has been the minor's only home.
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately
one year.
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either
in the form alimony or child support.
3

10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized.
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated.
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports
such finding is as follows:
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4
December, 1978.
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200 West,
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile
home.
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name,
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that
4

same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling,
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of outbuildings and a metal building.
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the
realty.
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission,
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintifffs minor
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant'svknowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, and 1983.
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties'
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00.
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether
6

these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account.
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of
four parcels of realty, to wit:
a. Parcel 1625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot
Concord.
b. Parcel 2640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home.
c. Parcel 36072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
d. Parcel 4746 West 600 North, Orem, Utah
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977,
7

reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately
$5,000.00.
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser.
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux1s assessment of the valuations
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for
the following reasons:
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
8

Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements,
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout,
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion,
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties,
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost.
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:
9

$20,000.00

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of ,the retirement
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant
was in such employment."
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980
Chrysler automobile.
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979
Chevrolet pick-up truck.
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as
opposed to property accumulated during the parties' marital^
relationship.
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint.
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees.

12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her
marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his
marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other.
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow.
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the
remainder of each account.
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship
that existed between the parties both prior to and after
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monitory values of the properties.
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
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Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
11. It is proper that the parties1 personally as noted in
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds
therefrom divided equally between them.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter,
15

(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement,
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove.
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00.
Dated this y

day of A«gwrt, 1989.

Approved as to form:
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APPENDIX "E"

OP*
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
363 North University
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

]

Plaintiff,

;)

v

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

]

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

]|

No. CV 87 2408

]

This matter ; having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
her marriage to Defendant,
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
his marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after

1

the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987.
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a
$4 00.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is
hereby awarded the remainder of each account.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More
particularly described as:
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to
Plaintiff.
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right,
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements
- including the mobile home - situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 640
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold,
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties.
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment with the federal government during the marital
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her
3

share of such benefits until Defendant retires• If Defendant
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as,,well as a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her.
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees
the sum of $1000.00.

/J'

Dated this «J7C/_ day of August, 1989.
By^thcKCou&t:

Ra*Q&. Harding,
Ju|ge
Fourth Judicial District
Utah County
Approved as to form:

Robert L. Md^odM
Attorney for Defendant

APPENDIX
30-1-4.5

n

F"

HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out
of a contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 246, § 2.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch.
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap-

ter 246, or the\application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized
person — Validity.
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they
have been lawfully married.
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1187;
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-1-5.

Cross-References. — Authorized person required to solemnize marriage, § 30-1-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Foreign common-law marriages.
This section does not render valid a commonlaw marriage entered into in a foreign state

where such marriages are recognized. In re
Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183
(1946).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage
§§ 39, 106.
C.J.S. — 55 C J.S. Marriage § 29.
AX.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by

lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it,
13 A.L.R.4th 1323.
Key Numbers. — Marriage *» 27.

